THE IRISH MARITIME FORUM

POSITION PAPER

TOWARD BALANCED DEFENCE FORCES FOR AN ISLAND NATION

DEFENCE POLICY 2014

9th October 2013
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SUMMARY

The relationship between the various arms of the Irish Defence Forces was determined in the 1940s, at a time when Irish maritime jurisdiction was limited to three nautical miles from shore and the major threat was from interstate conflict in Europe. Irish defence policy was almost exclusively land-oriented.

While many advances, in terms of resources and capability, have been made in all Arms of the Defence Forces, the basic organisational structure is still rooted in the early part of the last century. It takes little account of Ireland’s island status or of the dramatic increases in Ireland’s maritime, indeed oceanic, jurisdiction and responsibilities, which are now fully recognised in other fora, nationally and internationally. This has led to imbalances in Defence policy and decision making.

The security situation on land has improved and the threats presented by internal conflict and instability have diminished to a large degree. At the same time the challenges posed by an expanded maritime domain have correspondingly increased. This situation presents an opportunity to shift the emphasis from largely land-oriented defence and security to a more balanced posture, by increasing the emphasis on controlling our maritime domain.

There is an obvious and pressing need for a root-and-branch, open-minded approach to Irish defence planning and capability, based, not on minor adjustments to the 1940’s status quo, but on a recognition of the fundamentally changed circumstances of the 21st Century. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming White Paper will illustrate such an approach.

The majority of the proposals contained in this paper are cost neutral. TIMF recognises that the requirement for fleet replacement and expansion, while pressing, must be viewed in the context of the overall national financial position. However it is TIMF’s opinion that a fleet expansion is required and if not an option in the short to medium term it should be a stated objective of the White Paper. Attention should also be given to developing capability in gap areas, such as emergency response, mine countermeasures and submarine detection, and to the level of financial assistance available from the EU. (See Section 8, p. 15)

The forthcoming White Paper on Defence offers the opportunity to address these issues.
The Irish Maritime Forum urges:

a) That the opportunity presented by this White Paper be grasped to develop a holistic approach to Irish maritime defence and security. (see Sections 2, 3)

b) That the balance between the elements of the Irish Defence Forces reflects the fact that we are an island nation, with a greatly enhanced maritime domain (see Section 8)

c) That the position of the Navy within the Defence organisation be upgraded to reflect international norms (see Section 3, 7)

d) That the strength, composition and capabilities of the Navy be enhanced, within recognized budgetary constraints. (see Pages 7-12)

e) That Irish Naval assets participate in UN/EU sponsored missions to promote international maritime security and to operate ‘seamlessly’ alongside other EU Defence Forces, as recommended by the 2000 White Paper. (see Section 8)

f) That affirmative action be taken to improve public knowledge and recognition of the tasks and capabilities of the current naval force, which should be entitled ‘The Irish Navy”, Cabhlach na h-Éireann” (see Section 6, 9)

g) That the unique contribution of the Navy to national economic recovery be recognised and enhanced (see Section 8, Page 22)
1. INTRODUCTION
The Irish Maritime Forum (TIMF) is an independent and non-political collegiate of professionals who have a wide range of experience in the maritime domain. TIMF members hold, or have held, positions at the highest level in national and international maritime organisations.

The vision of TIMF is to increase awareness of the importance of Ireland’s Maritime Dimension in the national interest. We are an island nation and we claim the largest maritime domain to landmass of any Northwest European State. **92% of Ireland is under water.** This domain contains natural resources with a potential value of several Trillion Euro including mineral deposits, fossil fuels, marine life, fisheries and wind and wave energy. We are a small trading nation living on an island and 99% of everything we import or export is transported by sea. The sea and air traffic between Northern Europe and the USA passes close to our shores and through or above waters over which we have jurisdiction and for which we have responsibility.

TIMF is encouraged by the content of the joint statement of the Taoiseach and Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine included in the report entitled “Harnessing our Ocean Wealth”, specifically:

“**We are determined to put behind us the days of underachievement in the marine area. We want to make our ocean wealth a key component of our economic recovery and sustainable growth, generating social, cultural and economic benefits for all our citizens.**”
2. THE WHITE PAPER 2000 AND ITS FORMULATION

The White Paper on Defence 2000, which was the first in the history of the State, did not address to any great degree the maritime defence and security requirements of Ireland. Indeed the composition of the Steering and Working Groups established to carry out the review prior to the publication of the White Paper emphasised the imbalance in strategic thinking.

The Steering Group consisted of a Major General, a Colonel, an Assistant Secretary and a Principal Officer. The Working Group consisted of two Colonels and two Principal Officers. There was no permanent Naval representation on either group.

The following quotation from the White Paper eloquently indicates the level of study and consideration given to the naval defence and security of this island and its maritime domain at a time when Ireland’s maritime reach had expanded to 200 nautical miles:

“The naval component of defence has necessarily had a lower priority than landbased defence. Having regard to the defence and security environment assessment, the Government consider that there is no case for a significant shift in defence provision towards an enhanced naval contribution.”

This sweeping and bald statement was unsupported by reasoned analysis. Chapter 2 was entitled “Defence and Security Environment Assessment”. Nowhere in its several pages was there any reference to the relativity of naval and land-based defence. The new White Paper gives Ireland her first opportunity to realistically assess this relativity.

TIMF asserts that not enough has been done in the past to counter the defence and security challenges in Irish Waters, in the waters under Irish control and to protect Irish interests on the High Seas. TIMF cautions against ignoring certain issues in the Maritime Domain because they might be seen as the responsibility of another Government Department. This is not in the overall national interest. TIMF would like to see this White Paper embracing the broad range of security and defence issues in the maritime domain.

There should be formal, senior and continuous Naval representation on the Steering and Working Groups preparing the White Paper.
3. THE GREEN PAPER AND A GLARING OMISSION

TIMF has decided to make a submission to the forthcoming Green/White Paper consultative process to counter the above situation, namely that the Navy’s voice has not been heard in the decision making fora of the Defence Organisation, with our Navy having the same status as an Army brigade and not represented on the General Staff.

In particular the make-up of the Steering and Working Groups preparing the White Paper 2000 ensured that its recommendations would be land-centric.

The content of the recently published Green Paper has done nothing to allay our concerns. In the Introduction a “range of influences” is listed to guide our thinking on “a new vision for Defence and Defence policy”. This “new vision” does not, however, even mention that we live on an island or that our seaborne trade is vital. Setting out the “range of influences” and failing to note that Ireland is an island is richly indicative of the mindset revealed above. Surely, a Green Paper for Ireland’s Defence and Security cannot omit to mention the most obvious of defence and security facts – we are surrounded by water.

Indeed in the whole document, with a few exceptions, “Army” could be substituted for “Defence Forces” without detracting from the text. A detailed list of the Army’s principal equipment is given, while for the Navy there is a superficial listing of the number of ships by type (e.g. 1 helicopter patrol ship, 2 large offshore patrol ships ...) without any similar detail as to the size, armament, range or any other capability of the ships. In addition, there is a detailed table of the Army’s activities during the year 2012; for the Navy there is a one line able stating ‘Number of patrol days planned and number of patrol days achieved’. There is no mention of the number of boardings and inspections carried out, the number of warnings issued, the number of vessels detained, participation in SAR operations or the fact that the Navy operates over 20 Memoranda of Understanding or Service Level Agreements with State and other organisations.

Thus, it is depressingly clear that, in the drafting of the current Green Paper, once again land-centric thinking has been dominant.
4. WHY IRELAND SHOULD HAVE A NAVY

As already mentioned, TIMF’s expertise is in maritime matters and accordingly it wishes to make its submission purely in that area. We make the submission hoping to redress a national lack of knowledge and interest in the sea and we are heartened by the Taoiseach’s stated determination to “put behind us the days of underachievement in the marine area”.

The primary business of the Navy is to enforce, at sea, Defence Policy as decided by the Government, just as it is the primary business of the Army to do likewise on land. A policy of neutrality brings with it obligations as well as benefits. The fact that our capability may be limited, or may be made in co-operation with others, does not alter the principle, as was clearly set out in the 2000 White Paper.

Having recognised this principle, important subsidiary issues which subsequently fall to be dealt with by naval forces include:

• Disruption to Sea Lines of Communication within Irish controlled waters.
• Ireland’s geographic position as a route to the EU for the importation of illicit narcotics.
• Illegal trafficking other than narcotics.
• The loss to the economy from illegal fishing.
• Terrorist activity in our maritime domain.
• Proximity to the busiest shipping, air and undersea cable routes in the world.
• The impact of piracy on international trade and thereby on the Irish economy.
• Competing sovereignty claims over our maritime jurisdiction.
• Economic insecurity as a result of poorly resourced maritime security services in the region of our now recognised abundant subsea and seabed natural resources.
• Threats to Irish flagged or owned merchant shipping
• The ever-growing exploitation of our maritime resources with the consequent need to monitor activity and be in a position to act to protect Ireland’s interests.

Effective policing of our maritime domain is an important indicator of our determination to exploit our marine resources effectively and sustainably. One of the principal arguments used against Ireland in the EEC accession talks was that Ireland was neither exploiting nor protecting its fisheries. This contributed to the loss of 90% of our fisheries resources.

The EU is currently developing a Maritime Security Strategy that identifies the prosperity of the EU, its economic development and the well-being of its citizens as being critically dependent on the sea. As a result of its geostrategic location Ireland will have a significant role to play in its implementation. The threats mentioned above dovetail into those EU concerns, listed below, for a well policed sea domain bordering the EU.
EU Maritime Strategic Interests

• “Safety and security of citizens;
• Prevention of conflicts, preservation of peace and strengthening of international security;
• Security of EU ships;
• Security of critical maritime infrastructure (including off shore installations and underwater pipelines);
• Freedom of navigation and protection of international maritime trade (safe and secure maritime routes);
• Adequate control of EU’s external maritime borders;
• Prevention of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing;
• Smooth and timely flow of maritime trade (supply chain security);
• Protection of EU’s maritime domain against threats and risks through good (regional) maritime governance;
• Ecological integrity of EU coastal areas, seas and oceans;
• Promotion of international maritime cooperation and the rule of law.”

All of the threats detailed above can be countered by a military maritime force and many have been encountered in an Irish context and dealt with by our Navy. In Paragraph 1.3.4 of the White Paper on Defence 2000 it was recognised that there was a requirement for an armed force to act on the State’s behalf in response to security challenges at home and abroad. The March 2011 briefing paper to the current Minister for Defence states that the “Naval Service provides the maritime component of the State’s defence capability”. It goes on to state that “the Naval Service has a concurrent multi functional role as the State’s primary seagoing agency.” We deduce from these statements that the need for a military maritime force (or Navy) exists and has been accepted by successive Governments. We further contend there is general acceptance of the concept that the Navy should be the first to be called on to counter any of the threats listed above.

Noting, for the reasons stated above, that there is acceptance that a Navy is required by Ireland we now examine its status within the Defence Forces and how it is perceived by the average citizen and taxpayer. TIMF is of the opinion that our Navy has historically been under-resourced and that this has come about through its status within the Defence Forces and its perception by the citizen. We further believe that this has been brought about by Irish history since independence and not through a natural aversion to engagement with the sea by the population as a whole.
5. HISTORY

Prior to 1922 Irish mariners and seafarers were to be found throughout the world. In particular in many of the world’s navies Irish mariners achieved distinction through professionalism, skill and daring. The names of Barry and Browne are recognised with pride by the US and Argentine Navies, as are Beaufort, Shackleton and Crean by our nearest neighbour.

We believe that the genesis of the lack of interest in Ireland's maritime development, and in particular Naval development, can be found in the Treaty Debates of 1921. A British memorandum of 27OCT21 stated “Of supreme importance [is that] Ireland will have no Navy.” By December this stance had modified somewhat to include an additional statement which found its way into Article 6 of the Treaty.

Article 6 stated “Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by His Majesty’s Imperial Forces”. Article 6 permitted only “such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries”. In addition provision was made for a review of this arrangement after five years but this was never carried out, collapsing at the preliminary discussions in April 1927. Thus were sown the seeds for the current unsatisfactory situation.

The hasty formation of the “Marine Service” at the commencement of World War II as an element of the Directorate of Operations at Army Headquarters reflected the lack of appreciation of how a Naval force should be constituted within a defence organisation. The subsequent establishment of the “Naval Service” in 1946 as a permanent branch of the Defence Forces did not address this imbalance, whereby an inordinate emphasis was placed on the land defence of this island to the detriment of naval defence. Thus, the position of Irish naval defence, both planning and command, was set in stone at a time when Ireland had turned her back on the sea, and exercised jurisdiction over a mere three nautical miles from shore, this in turn having been determined by the range of early 19th century cannon-shot. While Naval resources have been increased in the interim, the planning and command structure remains as it was in the 1940's.
6. PERCEPTION

Throughout its existence there has been a constant perception of the lack of the Navy’s importance within the Defence Organisation. This perception is reflected and reinforced in many important and consistent ways.

• There are three layers, two Army and one Civil Service, between Naval Command and the Minister for Defence.
• There is no ex-officio naval membership of the Defence Forces Strategic Management Committee.
• Within the last fifteen years, Naval HQ was relocated from Defence Forces HQ to the Naval Base on Haulbowline Island in Cork Harbour. Thus, uniquely in European maritime States, the Navy is separated, physically and organisationally, from systematic input into Defence planning. This situation is obviously highly anomalous and should be amended to reflect 21st century realities.
• With the exception of the March 2011 briefing paper for the Minister for Defence, mentioned in Section 4 above, which used the term “Domestic Security” all documents of which we are aware stating the deliverables of the Defence Forces define the area to which the Navy contributes as “on-island security” rather than “national security”.
• On important ceremonial occasions, the Navy is consistently under-represented. During his inauguration, President Higgins was escorted by four Army officers, thus reinforcing the public perception of the relative unimportance of the Navy. In any other country, all Arms would have been represented. In the 90+ years since the foundation of the State only one Naval officer has been appointed Aide de Camp to the Taoiseach. A Naval Officer has never been appointed ADC to the President. This is not proportionate.
• Public perception of the capabilities and tasks of the Navy is still firmly stuck in the era of the three corvettes. This is in some contrast to international perception. Most people would be surprised to learn that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) have sent officers to study Irish Navy methods. When New Zealand began building Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV’s), the officers earmarked to command them spent several months afloat and ashore with our Navy prior to assuming their commands.

All of the above bullet points create and reinforce a mindset, at public and political level, that the Navy and matters maritime are low in the priorities of both the Defence Forces and the Department of Defence.

Affirmative action is needed to counter this perception.
7. ORGANISATION

The current review presents opportunities to redress the organisational imbalances in the structure of the Defence Forces. A number of possibilities present themselves.

• The appointments of Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) and Deputy Chief of Staff (Support) should always include one Naval officer. Rotating Naval officers through these types of appointments, including the most senior one, is the norm in most countries, even those that are not islands, e.g. Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, UK and USA.

• Upgrade the status and rank of Naval command to that of a DCOS with a permanent position on the Strategic Management Committee.

The structures adopted by Finland and New Zealand are particularly relevant. See Appendices 1 and 2.

There are many other examples of options to achieve balance to be found worldwide.

Naval Officers are fully qualified for these positions by virtue of having completed the Defence Forces Command and Staff Course.
8. KEY QUESTIONS POSED BY THE GREEN PAPER

In Para 2.8 of the Green Paper, Key Policy Questions are posed as follows.

**Q1 “Apart from the security challenges set out, are there additional security concerns that should be considered?”**

a. As is stated in the Green Paper, the area of operations to be covered by the Navy has grown exponentially since the publication of the last White Paper. However the question of how to defend and secure this vastly increased area was not posed or alluded to. To patrol the area encompassed by the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (410,000 sq km), the White Paper on Defence 2000 recommended 8 ships and 1144 personnel. How to address the expansion of our maritime domain from 410,000 sq km to 1,000,000 sq km is surely an "additional security concern".

Ireland's fisheries and sovereign maritime zone are more than twelve times the land area of Ireland. According to the Marine Institute the total available catch off Ireland is €1.18 billion. As our fisheries are a shared resource with our EU partners there is the potential for conflict between fishermen competing for dwindling resources. Indeed Irish fishermen's organisations contend that Ireland's take from this shared resource is a mere €0.19 billion, leaving the remaining almost €1 billion worth of fish to be harvested by our European partners. In order to ensure that conflict be kept to a minimum the Navy maintains a presence in our EEZ and is supported by state of the art technology such as satellite monitoring and computer assisted surveillance. The Navy also provides assistance to fishing vessels should they be in distress in heavy seas, from fire or if their crews are in need of medical assistance.

In recent years, delivering fishery protection has become more complex as a result of developments in EU legislation. The European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) is a European Union body established in 2005 to organise operational coordination of fisheries control and inspection activities by the Member States and to assist them to cooperate so as to comply with the rules of the Common EU Fisheries Policy in order to ensure its effective and uniform application. This activity has resulted in the Navy co-ordinating some of the joint deployment exercises and also supplying platforms to carry inspectors from other member states. It is likely that this developing activity will increase into the future.

The potential for conflict is also present as Ireland exploits its offshore hydrocarbon assets. According to estimates published by the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (DCENR), the Atlantic Margin has the potential to yield 10 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE). Successful realisation of these resources would have a dramatic effect on Ireland's economic situation.

It will fall to the Navy to provide the secure environment in which such resource exploitation can be effectively conducted.
In “Harvesting Our Ocean Wealth” at page 34 the following is found: “The creation of the conditions needed for economic growth, investment and job creation depend on the State ensuring a safe, secure and protected environment consistent with best international standards of governance and the protection of the maritime environment. This means Ireland must have in place effective and efficient security and surveillance arrangements and quality maritime regulatory regimes that meet best practice within which our ocean wealth can prosper. **In order to provide assurances to investors and meet our international obligations, Ireland must continually improve national capabilities in the area of security, safety, surveillance and eco-protection of the maritime domain.** This will be achieved through effective enforcement of maritime safety standards, improved information sharing and increased cooperation and innovation among all actors, at both national and EU level, **together with the effective deployment of air and sea surveillance, monitoring and enforcement capacity.** Ireland also needs to continue to provide an effective maritime administration to ensure that Irish flagged ships and Irish ports can trade freely with the world.”

In the New Zealand Defence White Paper of 2010 at Para 2.11 the following passage can be found: “Ninety-six percent of New Zealand lies underwater, if our extended continental shelf is included. Our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) contains rich marine resources, and further valuable resources may be contained in the seabed. We need to ensure that entry and exit to our territory, and the exploitation of New Zealand’s resources, are by legal means only. The NZDF contributes to these security objectives through its surveillance efforts and interdiction capabilities.”

There are many similarities between NZ and Ireland, including **inter alia**, population, climate and a large EEZ. However when it comes to Naval forces the similarities end. The RNZN is made up of 1910 regular personnel and 331 reservists. The RNZN’s fleet comprises eleven modern, versatile ships, including two frigates, that undertake a full range of maritime tasks from combat and peacekeeping operations to border patrol and support for other government agencies. Naval aviation comprises a mix of Navy and Air Force personnel who operate and maintain a fleet of five Seasprite SH-2G Helicopters. These armed helicopters act as a performance multiplier for the ships embarking them, extending their surveillance parameters and their ability to conduct boarding operations away from their host ship.

One problem which New Zealand does not have is the responsibility of controlling a significant portion of the Atlantic approaches to Europe and the significant seaborne traffic that that entails. In the Statistical Analysis Report 2007 - 2012 of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre- Narcotics (MAOC-N), the EU’s coordinating authority for drug interdiction, we find: “**Due to their Atlantic seabords, many Western European states are entry points to the rest of Europe and arguably the first line of defense.**” The report also stated that 90% of cocaine seized was on board sailing and fishing vessels.
A cursory glance at the patrol and interdiction assets available to the five nations on the Atlantic flank of Europe, i.e. UK, Ireland, France, Spain and Portugal, will quickly show that the weak point is located in the waters controlled by Ireland.

TIMF believes that an increase in ship numbers is justified given the increase in the task which is required and will be required of the Navy into the future. TIMF also believes that an increase in the size of the future builds is justified given the harshness of the environment in which they will operate. Attention should also be given to developing capability in gap areas, such as emergency response, mine countermeasures and submarine detection.

Based on considerable professional experience TIMF is strongly of the opinion that satellite monitoring and sharing of information, while most valuable, will stand as nought if Ireland does not have the capability to put ships to sea and maintain them on station to interdict bad actors in our maritime domain. Only boarding parties from Naval ships can verify information gleaned from space based sensors and other remote sources.

Based on the New Zealand model a more balanced Defence Force for this island nation would see the Navy's fleet increase to at least 12 ships to provide a constant presence in our maritime territories. To operate 12 ships it is considered that the strength of the Navy should be increased to 1500 with a substantial increase in the Naval Reserve. This would then compare favourably with New Zealand’s 11 ships and 1,910 regular personnel.

TIMF recognises that the requirement for fleet replacement and expansion, while pressing, must be viewed in the context of the overall national financial position. However it is TIMF’s opinion that a fleet expansion is required and if not an option in the short to medium term it should be a stated objective of the White Paper. The cost burden might be eased with EU subvention. (Reference EC COM (2103) 245 Final dated 22/4/21013, Article 78 Para 2 (e))

b. The Green Paper does not consider the possibility of disruption to Sea Lines of Communication within Irish controlled waters or the threats to Irish flagged or owned merchant shipping both in home waters and transiting international waters. Sea-based transport accounted for 99% of the total volume (45 million tonnes) and 95% of the total value (€128 billion) of the goods traded (imports/exports) in Ireland in 2010. One of the primary roles of the Navy is the protection of these sea lines of communication. It is clearly essential for our survival as a sovereign State that our trade routes remain uninterrupted, enabling Ireland to continue to do business.

Dublin Port alone has a throughput of 28 million tonnes per year, ten to twelve visits from ferries every day and a daily average of 6-8 other vessels loading and discharging cargo. Sixty per cent of the country’s oil products (petrol, diesel, jet fuel) come in through one single jetty in Dublin where tankers discharge their cargo from home and abroad on an almost daily basis. To disrupt this operation would cause traffic and general transport
chaos within hours in the eastern seaboard region, including airports.

The Navy is an essential element in protecting the ports. This was demonstrated in 1982 when Irish fishermen blockaded all major Irish ports for several days. The Navy, once directed by the Government, conducted an operation in Dublin and Dun Laoghaire which lifted the blockade and re-opened all the ports almost immediately. Since then there have been several sporadic protests that have disrupted trade for short periods. In August 2009, protesting dock workers from an independent commercial terminal on industrial action took to the river in boats and disrupted ferry traffic at Dublin Port. Cork Harbour was blockaded in the 80's and again in recent years. In all these cases a Naval ship ensured the navigable channel was not impeded for merchant traffic. The Ports of Waterford, New Ross and Dunmore East were closed when a fisherman abandoned a mine which had become entangled in his net in the entrance to the harbour. The Naval Diving Team was required to dispose of the mine in order that commercial operations could resume safely.

Q2 “What will be the operational demands on the Defence Forces in future years and do the roles currently assigned to the DF reflect these future requirements?”

In Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth, Ireland’s Ocean Wealth is stated to include:

• “Some of the largest and most valuable sea fisheries resources in Europe;
• The western gateway for shipping to Europe’s busiest seaports;
• An ideal location for finfish, shellfish and seaweed aquaculture;
• Amongst the richest and most accessible renewable energy (wind, wave and tidal) resources in the world;
• Significant oil and gas resource potential as evidenced by recent discoveries and ongoing research;
• Opportunities to develop new products and services;
• Spectacular tourism and leisure opportunities and a rich maritime culture and heritage;
• A rich and diverse range of ecosystems, habitats and species and unique land seascapes;
• Contributes to our citizen’s wellbeing and quality of life;
• Irish flagged ships, including fishing vessels, trading globally;
• Irish qualified seafarers, fishers and recreational craft users working; and
• Irish maritime companies and organisations providing global products and services.”

Most of the above listed activities or resources take place in or are situated in the Navy’s area of operations. As the States primary seagoing agency it will fall to the Navy to provide the environment for these activities to flourish or the resources to be exploited legally.
Q3 “What capabilities does the Defence Organisation need for the period ahead including corporate skills, force composition, equipment platforms etc and how can we best prioritise our resources on human capital and equipment procurement?”

Resources
To reinforce the case for a fleet expansion see Table 1 below for a comparative analysis between the Naval forces of Sweden, Finland and Ireland, which illustrates some of the gaps in the Irish situation. These countries have been chosen because of their non-aligned defence policies, notwithstanding the fact that Ireland’s maritime jurisdiction and responsibilities are orders of magnitude greater than either.
Table 1
Comparative Analysis (Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2011–12)

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<td>Maritime Domain</td>
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<td>9 corvette 14 Inshore patrol</td>
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<td>Mine Counter Measures</td>
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The gaps in the Irish position are obvious.

There is no evidence that these gaps are even under consideration at policy level, still less operationally, which further illustrates the absence of Naval input to defence planning.

Thus, by international standards, we are ill equipped even to know what is going on in our maritime domain, still less to police it effectively.
The White Paper on Defence 2000 stated at Para 4.11.5

“The Government have decided that the Naval Service will be developed around the provision of a modern 8 ship flotilla. There will be a process of continuous investment and vessel replacement to ensure that the flotilla is capable of meeting military and other requirements.”

This was a minimalist position to cope with maritime defence and security requirements at the end of the last century.

The White Paper goes on to state at Para 4.11.9

“New vessels will be brought on stream to replace older ones as these fall due for replacement.”

Notwithstanding the fact that two ships are currently under construction, the fleet replacement programme has been allowed to fall significantly behind schedule. The ships currently under construction should have been delivered in 2008 and 2009 to replace LE Emer and LE Aoife which by then had reached their 30 year notional life span. LE Aisling should have been replaced in 2010. Eithne, Ciara and Orla fall due for replacement in 2014 and 2015. That this situation should have been allowed to develop is difficult to defend. That it was allowed to develop when the state was on a sound economic footing indicates the low priority of the Navy within the Defence Organisation.

It will be difficult, in the current economic climate, to get the fleet replacement programme back on schedule. However the period between 2015 and 2029, when Roisin is due for replacement must be utilised to catch up on replacements and expand the fleet to a realistic level to fulfill the tasks which the Navy must perform on behalf of the State.

Corporate/Professional Skills

In the area of corporate/professional skills, the Navy has been proactive in ensuring the highest level of academic qualification in all ranks. Due to its partnership with Cork Institute of Technology (CIT) the Navy has led the Defence Forces in ensuring that all its training has academic recognition within the National Framework of Qualifications (NFQ). All ranks have the potential to obtain degrees at Level 7 or 8 NFQ. Work is ongoing on putting in place programmes in management, leadership and other specialisations to Level 9 (Masters) and Level 10 (PhD). In fact, for many years personnel have been encouraged to achieve higher level academic qualification privately. Nonetheless, the skills and competency programmes of training and education should be reviewed frequently to reflect the needs of the Service and the State.
Naval Reserve

The Naval Reserve is being reduced in size. TIMF believes that this is counterproductive. The members of the Naval Reserve provide two essential supports to the navy. The Reserve is a repository of local knowledge of the areas in which they are based and can provide small craft and trained personnel in support of operational requirements within their local areas. The Reserve can also provide trained seagoing personnel to support the fleet in time of high intensity operations or to relieve regular personnel. The Naval Reserve should be enhanced as part of an overall improvement in naval capability.

Q4 “What options should be pursued in acquiring the capabilities required e.g. should the pooling and sharing of equipment platforms be considered?”

Price Waterhouse, which carried out several studies on the Navy prior to the White Paper on Defence 2000, was firmly against the idea of several small agencies operating vessels to carry out tasks which could be accomplished by Naval ships.

The White Paper 2000 restated this position at Para 4.11.8;

“The Naval Service’s ability to undertake tasks at sea is its unique contribution as a State agency. There are important effectiveness and efficiency benefits obtained through the single agency approach. To move away from a single agency policy would have significant ramifications for defence provision, particularly in relation to public expenditure and could lead to duplication of resources between those provided in the defence context and those provided for other maritime needs. The Government have decided that the emphasis will be on utilisation and development of the Naval Service to contribute to the maximum to all of the State’s requirements in the maritime domain.”

The acquisition by the Customs Service of two vessels, which have poor seakeeping capability and have yet to take part in any interdiction operation, flies in the face of this Price Waterhouse advice and subsequent Government decision.

To counter this trend the roles and responsibilities of the Navy need to be clearly stated and that, for economic and effectiveness reasons, the concept of the Navy as a “one stop shop” for the State’s requirements in the maritime domain needs to be re-emphasised. The Navy has the trained and experienced personnel, has some but not enough ocean going assets and has a reputation for achieving results.

Fragmentation of resources, such as is illustrated above, needs to be avoided at all levels. The need to increase Ireland’s Maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities is clear. How to achieve a realistic fleet composition in these challenging times will call for some imaginative thinking and innovative policies.
Moreover, in support of the implementation of EU Fisheries and Maritime activity management, the EU Maritime and Fisheries Fund may support funding for the modernisation and purchase of patrol vessels, aircraft and helicopters, provided they are used at least 60% of the time for fisheries control. *(Reference EC COM (2103) 245 Final dated 22/4/21013, Article 78 Para 2 (e)).*

In the past Ireland's geographical position and proximity to international air and sea routes has led to incidents to which the Navy has reacted positively. The Navy is usually in a position to have a ship on scene to provide the state with a professional situation report, to assume control of the situation and to ensure that the directives issued by the civil authority are adhered to by a casualty and its owners. Examples include Betelgeuse, Fastnet Yacht Race, Kowloon Bridge, Yarrawanga, Air India, Tit Bonnhomme. The Navy has towed coastal trading vessels and fishing vessels to safety. However the Navy, as it is currently equipped, would not have the capability to tow a larger vessel, e.g. tanker or car ferry, in the event that it was disabled and drifting into danger. Merchant ships are getting larger, faster and more numerous. Hard pressed shipping companies continue to reduce crews. Many of the recent shipping casualties were caused by human error brought on by fatigue.

In addition, global warming is causing the Arctic ice to melt making the seas north of Russia in what was called the Northeast Passage navigable for more than half the year. This has cut a voyage from Asia to Europe by over a third of that via the Suez canal. A proportion of these ships bound for continental ports will pass through Irish waters. All of the above increase the risk of a casualty in Irish waters.

**TIMF proposes that in the present economic climate a stage on the path to a realistic fleet size could be achieved by the provision of two Emergency Towing Vessels (ETV), possibly funded jointly by the Department of Defence and the Department of Transport, to be operated by the Navy as medium range Offshore Patrol Vessels unless required for their primary function under a Service Level Agreement, thereby addressing the shortage of patrol capacity while providing an emergency towing capability.** Under Naval operation the ETVs could fulfil other tasks such as Dive Support, specialised SAR and Pollution Control. The reason for two is to guarantee the availability of one at a given time. ETVs operated by the Navy would have the legal status of a warship, with the special powers and international protections associated with such ships.

Being able to deal with marine casualties is the responsibility of a coastal state.
Q5 “How can Ireland's traditional policy of military neutrality be dovetailed with increasing requirements for Defence participation in collective security cooperation?”

Neutrality

TIMF does not take a position on whether Ireland should or should not be neutral. However TIMF is of the opinion that our current policy is not legitimate in international law insofar as we lack the capability to deny the use of our territorial seas to belligerents. TIMF would urge a more realistic approach to the subject of Ireland’s neutrality.

Collective Security Cooperation

The Irish policy of supporting UN military missions has been very successful over the years and reflects great credit on all concerned. However, while the Green Paper lists 37 missions undertaken by Ireland since 2000, there has been no deployment, despite requests, of Naval assets to such missions. Such a commitment, which would normally be short-term, would confirm Ireland’s recognition of its international obligations as a maritime nation by helping to keep open sea lines of communication, ensuring supply chain security, reducing shipping insurance costs and enhancing Ireland’s declared determination to improve its maritime position.

The possible involvement of the Navy in international Naval operations against piracy in the Indian Ocean was apparently dismissed on the grounds that no Irish merchant ships were, or likely to be, affected. This shows poor understanding of modern international trade, where the flag of a merchant ship rarely reflects the ownership of the vessel, its operators, its cargo or its crew. The cargo onboard can be bound for any country, and a Panamanian flagged container ship en route for example from Rotterdam to Shanghai, can have several large consignment of goods from Irish exporters. Another factor is that interference in shipping, such as that caused by piracy, increases operating and insurance costs with a consequent increase in global freight rates. These are serious factors for an island nation absolutely dependent on seaborne international trade.

It was also stated by a previous Minister for Defence that Irish Naval vessels were not suitable for this duty. This is not the case. Offshore Patrol Vessels similar to Irish OPVs are frequently deployed by other countries, such as Finland, Italy, France, Spain and Sweden and are regarded at EU level as “another very valuable asset provided by Member States”. They are described by staff at the EU Anti-piracy headquarters as “very effective for coastal operations, surface surveillance, intelligence collection, escorting and interdiction.” Many countries which would not be considered to have major Navies have participated in the EU anti-piracy Operation Atalanta off Somalia. See Appendix 3.
Naval Collective Security Cooperation

During the Irish Presidency of the EU in 2004, the Battlegroups 20 concept was adopted and has introduced the capability to deploy forces at high readiness. Since January 2007 two Battlegroups are required to be on stand-by for a period of six months at a time. Ireland has participated in the Nordic Battlegroup (2008 and 2011) and participated in the Austrian / German Battlegroup which was on standby for the second six months of 2012. Ireland’s operational deployment with a Battlegroup remains subject to the “triple lock” mechanism. To date, there has been no operational deployment of an EU Battlegroup. An opportunity to participate in the naval equivalent of the Battlegroup concept was missed when the cost of piracy to international trade and thereby to the Irish economy became apparent. Irish decision makers were unwilling to react positively and no Irish naval vessel participated in an EU Naval Taskforce, Operation ATALANTA.

Operation ATALANTA, combined with defensive measures which have been taken by merchant ships, has caused a sharp decline in reported piracy in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. Attacks have reduced from 192 attacks in 2010 to just 8 in the first half of 2013, according to the International Maritime Bureau, the global sea security agency on which the United Nations relies for maritime security statistics. As piracy is unlikely to disappear entirely, is it not prudent that Ireland should prepare for a naval deployment in the future?

The White Paper 2000 states “The Defence Forces must be able to operate seamlessly alongside other EU Member States.” It seems therefore quite anomalous that Ireland, as a leading maritime member state, has not seized the opportunity to develop this operational capacity within its Navy.

Q6 “How can Defence further contribute to economic recovery e.g. options for increased engagement with Irish industry?”

The Navy had led the way in engaging with education and industry to harness the maritime expertise of its personnel on behalf of the nation and its economic wellbeing. In 2004, the Navy entered into academic partnership with the Cork Institute of Technology (CIT) for the purpose of delivering education and training to both military and civilian seafarers. As a result, a new, fit-for-purpose, National Maritime College of Ireland (NMCI) was built at Ringaskiddy adjacent to the Naval Base. This unique partnership has proven to be very successful in focussing Ireland’s third level maritime education into a single, state of the art location or ‘one stop shop’. The NMCI has since developed the Halpin Centre for research. The Centre will facilitate the research inputs of both CIT and Navy to the overall research effort in Maritime and Sustainable energy and represents another example of the importance of the Navy’s collaborative strategy. The partnership has proven to be a catalyst towards the implementation of an innovation agenda, setting the context for the paradigm shift in which the Navy is moving from a position of being a net
consumer to one that facilitates net production, thereby being an enabler of enterprise and producer of resources. In this context it is worth noting that three of the nine finalists in the 2013 IMERC Innovator of the Year Award were Naval personnel.

Working in close cooperation with academic partners at the NMCI and University College Cork’s (UCC) Coastal Marine Research Centre (CMRC) on Haulbowline, the Navy was enabled to develop its innovation agenda towards a maritime cluster. The cluster and the collaborative relationships therein, sparked interest amongst several maritime groups. In 2008, a large group of maritime stakeholders met to discuss the possibility of pooling Ireland’s maritime industrial research in a single location, adjacent to the NMCI. The Irish Maritime and Energy Resource Cluster (IMERC) emerged.

IMERC represents a unique integrated institutional arrangement between the Navy, CIT and UCC that brings together a critical mass of expertise in the fields of marine energy, shipping logistics and transport, maritime safety and security and marine recreation. This maritime cluster represents a national initiative with significant potential to drive the economy in the maritime sector. The development of maritime clusters is fully supported and encouraged by the EU Integrated Maritime Policy. The NMCI/IMERC Campus arguably represents the centre of gravity of Ireland’s emerging maritime quarter. Its location in one of the largest natural harbours in the world with its related infrastructure, and its adjacency to both the Navy and one of the world’s busiest trade route presents a winning formula.

This an ideal model for the Defence Forces as a whole and should be recognised in the forthcoming White Paper.
9. BRANDING OF OUR NAVAL FORCE

The question must be asked, why in 1940 and 1946 the naval arm of the Defence Forces was called in succession The Marine Service and The Naval Service. The opportunity to be clear and unambiguous as to the raison d’etre of the new force was missed. To this day Irish citizens and taxpayers are unclear as to the status, functions and role of the Naval Service, in spite of many efforts by the Navy itself and in spite of statements in official Department of Defence documents. This, we believe, is a reflection of its title.

Para 3.3.3 of the 2000 White Paper on Defence stated the first of the refined roles of the Defence Forces as “to defend the State against armed aggression”. Para 4.11.1 states “The Naval Service provides the maritime element of the State’s Defence Forces.... The Naval Service has a general responsibility to meet contingent and actual maritime defence requirements”. These are the roles of a Navy. We are therefore unclear as to why what is by definition a Navy continues to be called the Naval Service.

Ireland is not apologetic about having an Army. Why should we be apologetic about having a Navy?

Are we still adhering to the British memorandum of 27OCT21 which stated “Of supreme importance [is that] Ireland will have no Navy.”

TIMF recommends that the official title of the naval element of the State’s Defence Forces should be The Irish Navy (Cabhlach na h-Éireann).
10. **CONCLUSION**

Throughout its history, the Navy has carried out the many and varied roles assigned by Government, albeit with modest resources. It completed a major reorganisation in 2000 followed by a value for money implementation plan delivering increased outputs, and since that time has effected significant strategic change in the areas of operational capability, strategic partnerships and innovation. This transformation has not gone unnoticed internationally. Both the Canadian and New Zealand Navies have seconded officers to study our Navy’s methods. The advent of the NMCI and IMERC has added to the transformation of the Navy.

There is an obvious and pressing need for a root-and-branch, open-minded approach to Irish defence planning and capability, not based on minor adjustments to the 1940’s status quo, but on recognition of the fundamentally changed circumstances of the 21st Century. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming White Paper will illustrate such an approach. The relationship of the various arms of the Defence Forces was determined in the 1940s, at a time when Irish maritime jurisdiction was limited to three nautical miles from shore and the major threat was from interstate conflict in Europe. The nature of this relationship is encapsulated in the fact that the land-based arm of the Defence Forces is universally known as the "Army", while the naval arm is officially and ambiguously the "Naval Service".

While many advances have been made in all arms, in terms of resources and capability, the basic organisational structure is still rooted in the early part of the last century. It takes little account of Ireland’s island status or of the dramatic increases in Ireland’s maritime, indeed oceanic, jurisdiction and responsibilities, which are now fully recognised in other fora, nationally and internationally. This has led to imbalances in Defence policy and decision making.

The security situation on land has improved and the threats presented by internal conflict and instability have diminished to a large degree. At the same time the challenges posed by an expanded maritime domain have correspondingly increased. This situation presents an opportunity to shift the emphasis from largely land oriented defence and security to a more balanced posture by increasing the emphasis on controlling our maritime domain.

The majority of the proposals contained in this paper are cost neutral. TIMF recognises that the requirement for fleet replacement and expansion, while pressing, must be viewed in the context of the overall national financial position. However it is TIMF’s opinion that a fleet expansion is required and if not an option in the short to medium term it should be a stated objective of the White Paper. Attention should also be given to developing capability in gap areas, such as emergency response, mine countermeasures and submarine detection, and to the level of financial assistance available from the EU. *(see Section 8, p. 19)*
The forthcoming White Paper on Defence offers the opportunity to radically remedy this situation. TIMF earnestly hopes that the specific points raised in this submission, in terms of the Defence Forces' responsibilities, organisation, capabilities and resources, receive open-minded and balanced consideration.

The Irish Maritime Forum urges:

a) That the opportunity presented by this White Paper be grasped to develop a holistic approach to Irish maritime defence and security. (see Sections 2, 3)

b) That the balance between the elements of the Irish Defence Forces reflects the fact that we are an island nation, with a greatly enhanced maritime domain (see Section 8)

c) That the position of the Navy within the Defence organisation be upgraded to reflect international norms (see Section 3, 7)

d) That the strength, composition and capabilities of the Navy be enhanced, within recognized budgetary constraints. (see Pages 7-12)

e) That Irish Naval assets participate in UN/EU sponsored missions to promote international maritime security and to operate ‘seamlessly’ alongside other EU Defence Forces, as recommended by the 2000 White Paper. (see Section 8)

f) That affirmative action be taken to improve public knowledge and recognition of the tasks and capabilities of the current naval force, which should be entitled ‘The Irish Navy”, Cabhlaí na h-Éireann” (see Section 6, 9)

g) That the unique contribution of the Navy to national economic recovery be recognised and enhanced (see Section 8, Page 22)
Appendix 1 FINNISH DEFENCE ORGANISATION

FDF COMMAND STRUCTURE 2012

Commander
Finnish Defence Forces

Chief Defence Command Finland
Defence Command

Defence Forces C4 Agency
Defence Forces International Centre
Defence Forces Military Intelligence Centre
Defence Forces Technical Research Centre
Centre for Military Medicine
Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment

Rector
National Defence University

Commander
Finnish Army

Commander
Finnish Navy

Commander
Finnish Air Force

Army Command Finland
- Commander Southern Command
  - Southern Command Headquarters
    - Guard Jaeger Regiment
  - Commander Eastern Command
    - Eastern Command Headquarters
    - Reserve Officer School
    - Karelka Brigade
    - North Karelia Brigade
  - Commander Western Command
    - Western Command Headquarters
    - Port Brigade
    - Artillery Brigade
    - Engineer Regiment
    - Armoured Brigade
    - Signal Regiment
    - Hame Regiment
  - Commander Northern Command
    - Northern Command Headquarters
    - Kainuu Brigade
    - Lapland Air Defence Regiment
    - Jaeger Brigade
  - Army Academy
  - Usti Jaeger Regiment

Director Army Materiel Command
- Army Materiel Command Headquarters
- South Finland Logistics Regimen
- West Finland Logistics Regimen
- East Finland Logistics Regimen
- North Finland Logistics Regimen
- Test Firing Centre
- Explosives Centre

Nineteen regional offices that are subordinate to the military commands and are regional authorities.

Navy Command Finland
- Gulf of Finland Naval Command
- Archipelago Sea Naval Command
- Nyland Brigade
- Naval Academy
- Naval Research Institute
- Naval Materiel Command

Air Force Command Finland
- Lapland Air Command
- Saatamantie Air Command
- Karelia Air Command
- Training Air Wing
- Air Force Academy
- Air Force Aircraft and Weapon Systems Training Wing
- Air Force Materiel Command

ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES TO THE FDF IN 2012

The Defence Forces Service Centre for Catering was closed down as the end of 2011. Its activities and personnel were transferred to Leijismaa Catering Ltd, which was established on 1 January 2012.

The Finnish Defence Forces C4 Agency acquired a headquarters on 1 January 2012. The restructuring agency now includes the Concept Development and Experimentation Centre, the Project Unit, the Network Unit and Services Unit.

Organisational changes in the Navy came into effect on 1 January 2012. The naval command support establishments were merged with the Navy Materiel Command and their logistics centres were allocated into brigade-level units; the Saimaa Coastal Regiment was relocated from Santahamina to Uptonemi and the Naval Training Centre was merged with the Regiment. Furthermore, two units in the Navy Materiel Command were merged and the Materiel Command acquired a headquarters. A Naval Combat Centre was established within the Naval Academy.

The Explosives Centre and the Test Firing Centre, which were previously part of the Army Materiel Command, were shut down at the end of 2012. These were replaced with a new Explosives Centre that began its operations at the beginning of 2013.
Appendix 2 NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE ORGANISATION

NZDF HIGH LEVEL FUNCTIONAL ORGANISATION AS AT 01 JULY 2013
Appendix 3
Countries Making Naval Contributions to Operation Atalanta,
The European Union International Anti-Piracy Force

Belgium
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Sweden
UK

It has been argued, including by a previous Minister for Defence, that Irish Naval vessels were not suitable for this duty. This is not the case. Offshore Patrol Vessels such as are operated by Ireland, are frequently deployed by other countries and are regarded at EU level as “another very valuable asset provided by Member States”. They are described by staff at the EU Anti-piracy headquarters as “ very effective for coastal operations, surface surveillance, intelligence collection, escorting and interdiction.”

It should also be noted that naval contributions do not necessarily involve long-term commitments. Spain, for instance, deploys OPV’s regularly during the inter-monsoon periods (2-3 months).

OPV’s are/have been deployed to Atalanta by Finland, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden.